My research focuses on the design of control of infrastructure systems using game theory and optimization in networks. My group works on three main areas: (1) Resilient network control; (2) Information systems and incentive design; (3) Optimal resource allocation in large-scale infrastructure systems. By focusing on important questions in the domains of highway transportation, electric power distribution, and urban water networks, we develop new theory and design tools for improving the performance of critical infrastructure systems in the face of disruptions, both stochastic and adversarial.
Our agenda is to design network monitoring and control algorithms and economic incentive schemes that help infrastructure users and operators make optimal decisions in the presence of uncertainties. This agenda is supported by our approach to: (i) model the cyber-physical interactions in infrastructures and assess their vulnerabilities; (ii) develop tools to detect and respond to both local and network-level failures; and (iii) design incentive schemes that improve the aggregate levels of public good, while accounting for the dependencies and private information among strategic entities.